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THE TOOLS OF LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW: TEACHING 
REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER PALAZZOLO 
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH* 
INTRODUCTION 
Last term the Supreme Court returned to the field of regulatory takings and 
bolstered the constitutional rights of property owners whose land is subject to 
environmental regulation.  It also handed Property teachers a gift.  In Palazzolo 
v. Rhode Island,1 the Court struck down a state court’s holding that a property 
owner who acquired land after the enactment of a land use regulation cannot 
claim that the regulation effects an unconstitutional “taking” of his property.  
According to the Court, a state may not automatically prevent post-enactment 
acquirers of property from pursuing takings claims because they “purchased or 
took title with notice of the limitation.”2  The takings clause is more than a 
notice provision.3  The temporal relationship between the regulation’s 
enactment and an owner’s acquisition of property does not determine whether 
he can claim that the regulation deprived him of his property.  In other words, 
the state is not completely free to alter constitutionally-protected property 
rights prospectively.  In the circumstances of Palazzolo, the holding is not 
controversial.4  The problem is that the Supreme Court previously directed 
state courts to define those constitutionally-protected property rights by using 
the state’s own “background principles of nuisance and property law,”5 and in 
Palazzolo the Court casts doubt on a state’s power to alter those background 
principles at all.  It is sometimes said that we have a common law 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001). 
 2. Id. at 2462. 
 3. Id. at 2463 (observing that a majority of the Court in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), rejected dissenting Justice Brennan’s proposition that those who 
purchase land after a regulation’s enactment take title “on notice” of the new regulation’s effect 
on their rights). 
 4. See, e.g., Leading Cases—Takings Clause, 115 HARV. L. REV. 447, 454 (2001).  See 
also infra note 55. 
 5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). 
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constitution,6 but not since the heyday of Classical Legal Thought a century 
ago has it been a doctrinal imperative.7  Which is to say that the common law 
of property, as subject matter and method, should enjoy renewed interest 
among practitioners, scholars and students. 
I.  USING REGULATORY TAKINGS TO TEACH THE TOOLS OF THE COMMON LAW 
There are three dimensions to a first-year common law course: doctrine, 
problem solving and policy analysis. The challenge is to integrate all three.  
While most topics in Property provide opportunities to explore each, few do so 
more than regulatory takings jurisprudence.  Learning the ways that courts 
distinguish legitimate exercises of the police power from compensable takings 
requires students to master complex doctrine, analyze problems creatively and 
grapple with highly-charged policies. 
Regulatory takings doctrine begins with the constitutional command that 
the government pay just compensation when it takes property for public use8 
and consists of the formulas used to determine whether a regulation in which 
the government does not physically appropriate the property amounts, 
constitutionally, to a taking.  Doctrine stemming from the constitutional clause 
comes in the form of both hard rules and flexible standards.9  The Supreme 
Court has established two per se rules.  One is that a permanent physical 
“invasion” by the government or its licensee is automatically a taking of 
property that demands compensation.10  The other is that a regulation depriving 
the owner of all economic benefit, and that is not designed to prohibit a 
traditional nuisance, is a taking of property requiring compensation.11  If these 
rules do not apply, courts turn to a flexible, multifactor standard that examines 
the character of the government regulation, the extent of its economic impact 
 
 6. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996). 
 7. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 27-31 (1992) (describing the common law boundaries of the 
police power in Classical Legal Thought); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF 
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937 (1998). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Supreme Court incorporated the takings clause against the 
states in 1897.  Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 9. For the distinction between rules and standards, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme 
Court, 1991 Term: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); MARK 
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING 
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW 
AND IN LIFE (1991); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).  See also 
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). 
 10. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 11. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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and the average reciprocity of advantage enjoyed by the affected property 
holder.12 
Doctrine is only the beginning.  The novice must also learn how to use 
these tools to analyze legal problems and develop persuasive arguments.  The 
two forms of regulatory takings doctrine—rules and standards—raise 
fundamental questions about the nature of legal reasoning and the judicial 
function.  What are the differences between rules and standards?  What are 
their advantages and disadvantages?  How does each work?  A rule is a strict 
strategy for enforcing a general principle agreed upon elsewhere.  The ideal 
rule constrains the decision-maker by forcing her to act automatically if the 
predicate facts are present.13  A rule may be over- or under-inclusive, but that 
is the price paid for limiting the decision-maker’s discretion to interpret the 
principle.  Of course, judges exercises some discretion when drawing lines and 
defining the key terms of a rule, so that, as Kathleen Sullivan observes, rules 
mark the far end of “a continuum, not a divide,” between mechanical and 
discretionary judging.14  To mitigate their harsh effects, rules often contain 
exceptions. 
Standards, on the other hand, require the decision-maker to exercise 
discretion.  Typically, standards contain factors that guide rather than compel 
the judge toward decision.  Here, the policy-maker articulates a broad principle 
but not the specific rule of enforcement and leaves it to the judge to apply the 
principle to individual cases.15  Standards involve judgments of degree rather 
than kind, quantity rather than quality, and fact-specific reasoning rather than 
mechanical deduction.16  The regulatory taking standard, for example, involves 
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”17  Class discussion of the differences 
between rules and standards illuminates not only takings law but also basic 
styles of legal reasoning that students will use throughout their careers. 
Finally, regulatory takings jurisprudence offers an opportunity to explore 
policy questions that occupy the contested borderland between law and 
politics.  Law and politics are two socio-intellectual strategies our society has 
developed to facilitate civilized life.18  We rely on both strategies when 
addressing divisive issues, and the two intertwine closely in the property 
course.  Legislation occupies much of our field, and even where it does not, 
 
 12. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 13. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 58-60. 
 14. Id. at 61.  See also id. at 61 n. 231. 
 15. Id. at 58-61. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 18. For a thoughtful analysis of the difference between legal and political modes of thought, 
see Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World, 
NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 71 (J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., 1986). 
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judges often revise doctrine in the light of social policy.19  From old limits on 
testamentary transfers to new forms of zoning and eminent domain, property 
law is where our society works out conflicts between private right and public 
will.  Property is power,20 which is one thing all students know before they 
open their casebooks. 
The way property law both facilitates and constrains that power is 
something we hope students learn before they sit for the final examination.  
They are quick to see that law can serve as an instrument to further private or 
public goals but are slower to grasp how legal culture helps define those goals.  
Law is means and ends; it contains rules (as well as standards) that we use to 
achieve our aspirations, but it also rules us in the sense that it delimits the 
realm of the possible in our constitutional culture and helps shape those 
aspirations in the first place.21 
Regulatory takings jurisprudence offers an excellent example of this 
tension between law’s instrumental and constitutive functions.  The Supreme 
Court is trying to use a state’s own “background principles” of property law to 
define the limits of that state’s police power.  But traditionally our legal culture 
has viewed property law as a state creation.  What is the content of a limitation 
on state power to regulate property that is defined in terms of the state’s own 
property regime?  A way to explore this tension is to ask students to play the 
role of a judge in an eminent domain case.  This allows them to see how the 
Court, in cases like Palazzolo, is struggling to halt the vertiginous circularity of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
II.  BACK TO THE FUTURE: URBAN ZONING AND COASTAL WETLANDS 
Role-playing is, of course, a venerable teaching strategy.  One variation I 
find rewarding is to put the students in the position of a real, historical judge 
sitting on the bench during another time period.  Anachronism reveals 
connections between areas of law, such as zoning and environmental land use 
regulation, that are separated in our casebooks.  The Supreme Court long ago, 
under Chief Justice William H. Taft, held zoning to be a valid exercise of the 
state police power,22 but in the past fifteen years, under the intellectual 
 
 19. For historical examples, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). 
 20. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). 
 21. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Robert 
Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of 
Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 
353 (David Thelen ed., 1988). 
 22. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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leadership of Justice Antonin Scalia,23 it has found some environmental land 
use regulations to effect takings.  After we read the canonical takings cases, 
like Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon24 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York, 25 as well as the more recent ones involving coastal wetlands 
regulation—Nollan v. California Coastal Commision,26 Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council27 and, this year, Palazzolo28—I give my students a 
homework assignment: Pretend that Justice Scalia sat on the Supreme Court in 
the 1920s and write the opinion that you believe he would have written in the 
epochal zoning case Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.29  Would he have voted with 
the Supreme Court majority to uphold zoning in 1926, or would he have struck 
down zoning as an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights? 
The federal trial judge in the Euclid case found that the local zoning 
ordinance, which reduced the development value of Ambler’s property by 
seventy-five percent, had taken property “without compensation under the 
guise of exercising the police power,”30 but the Supreme Court reversed and 
upheld zoning as a valid exercise of the police power.  Its opinion offers 
students a helpful commentary on the distinction between a valid exercise of 
the legislature’s police power and a regulatory taking: 
The line which . . . separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of 
power is not capable of precise delimitation.  It varies with circumstances and 
conditions . . . .  [T]he law of nuisances . . . may be consulted, not for the 
purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of 
ascertaining the scope of, the power.31 
The Court found that much of Euclid’s zoning ordinance fell within the 
legislative power to control nuisances, and it upheld the parts that did not, such 
as a restriction on apartment buildings, because in some circumstances those 
buildings “come very near to being nuisances.”32  The police power extended 
beyond the ability to control nuisances; its exercise was legitimate unless 
 
 23. Cf. Scott R. Ferguson, Note, The Evolution of the ‘Nuisance’ Exception to the Just 
Compensation Clause: From Myth to Reality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1539, 1543-45 (1994) (arguing 
that the germ of the nuisance exception was in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Penn Central). 
 24. 260 U.S. 393 (1986). 
 25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 26. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 27. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003. 
 28. 121 S.Ct. 2448. 
 29. 272 U.S. 365. 
 30. Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).  For a 
different conclusion from a noted land use planner at the time, see Alfred Bettman, 
Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834 (1924). 
 31. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387 
 32. Id. at 395. 
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“clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”33 
Euclid remains the foundational precedent for zoning.  Just four years 
earlier the Taft Court had struck down another exercise of the state police 
power in Pennsylvania Coal, and this remains a foundational precedent as well 
for regulatory takings jurisprudence.34  In that case, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. declared the “general rule . . . that while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”; 
the inquiry was “a question of degree.”35  Holmes articulated a standard 
containing three factors that a court should consider when judging whether a 
land use regulation goes “too far” and “takes” land without just compensation.  
The first is the “extent of the diminution.”36  Second, a court should balance 
the public interest in the legislation against the damage inflicted on private 
property.37  Third, a court should consider whether the regulation benefits the 
property owner by giving him some “average reciprocity of advantage” that 
helps compensate for the owner’s economic loss.38 
The role-playing exercise encourages the students to trace the roots of 
zoning and regulatory takings jurisprudence and compare the Court’s approach 
to those issues in the 1920s with the approach undertaken during the past 
fifteen years.  For today’s Court, like the Taft Court, is struggling with a new 
form of land use regulation—then it was zoning, now it’s wetlands protection. 
The origins of zoning and wetlands protection share similarities.  Both 
were designed to mitigate the negative effects of industrialization.  Federal 
incentives furthered each.  Vested rights in the form of extant development 
were generally protected under the two;39 development expectation values 
were not.  Zoning emerged over the course of several decades of ferment 
around the idea of city planning, but the first modern zoning ordinance was 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Cf. Gordon Hylton, Prelude to Euclid: The United States Supreme Court and the 
Constitutionality of Land Use Regulation 1900-1920, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2000) 
(juxtaposing the Euclid and Pennsylvania Coal cases). 
 35. Id. at 415-16.  For an analysis of Holmes’s Pragmatist reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal, 
see William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 
86 GEO. L.J. 813 (1998). 
 36. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 37. Id. at 413-14. 
 38. Id. at 415.  The Supreme Court reformulated these factors a half-century later in Penn 
Central as the character of the government regulation, the degree to which the regulation 
“frustrate[s] distinct investment-backed expectations,” and the degree to which the property 
owner reaps reciprocal advantage from the regulation.  438 U.S. at 105. 
 39. Zoning boards often exempted non-conforming uses in existence at the time the 
ordinance went into effect; coastal commissions usually let existing structures stand. 
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New York City’s in 1916.40  The Commerce Department then drafted a model 
Standard Zoning Enabling Act in 1924.  Many states soon passed similar 
enabling acts and localities followed with a bevy of zoning ordinances.41 
The proliferation of wetlands conservation statutes since the 1960s is also 
based on a cultural movement that eventuated in a national effort,42 but this 
time the federal government is an active partner with the states rather than 
merely an instructor.  The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, for 
example, established a federal agency that provides financial and technical aid 
to states that institute programs to protect coastal wetlands.43  Typically, a state 
establishes a commission to locate wetlands and then limits development on 
them.44  But despite similar origins, they have fared differently in the Supreme 
Court: zoning is safely within the state police power; wetlands regulation is 
not. 
From the bench, the students can see that the two phenomena are not 
identical.  First and most obviously, the exercise reveals the limits of the Lucas 
rule.  By definition, it only applies when the regulation deprives all economic 
benefit.  Justice Scalia could distinguish the zoning regulation in the city of 
Euclid on its facts because the ordinance deprived Ambler of seventy-five, not 
one hundred, percent of its property’s value.  How much this should matter is a 
question that gets the students thinking about the difference between analyzing 
a regulation with a bright line rule and with a flexible standard. 
Second, there was more measurable reciprocal advantage for Ambler than 
there is for developers restricted by environmental regulation today.  While 
Ambler could not maximize its land’s development value, it would not be 
harmed by commercial development nearby either.  Developers like Lucas, on 
 
 40. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE 
AGE 112-208 (1998); THE AMERICAN PLANNER: BIOGRAPHIES AND RECOLLECTIONS (Donald A. 
Krueckeberg ed., 2d ed. 1994) (1983); MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890 
(1971); ROY LUBOVE, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN NEW 
YORK CITY, 1870-1917 (1962). 
 41. Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 598-604 
(2001). 
 42. See Donald Fleming, The Roots of the New Conservation Movement, VI PERSPECTIVES 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1972); Stacy J. Silveira, Comment, The American Environmental 
Movement: Surviving Through Diversity, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 497 (2001). 
 43. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-65 (2000).  See also John R. 
Nolon, Land Use Controls that Achieve Smart Growth, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11025 (2001); Mark A. 
Chertok, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, SF97 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1149, 1170-71 (2001); John A. 
Duff, The Coastal Zone Management Act: Reverse Preemption or Contractual Federalism?, 6 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 109, 109-10 (2001).  For federal protection under the Clean Water Act 
of wetlands connected to internal navigable waters, see Peter L. Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Commission: A Practitioner’s Guide to Fifth Amendment Takings of 
Wetlands, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 411-12 (1997). 
 44. For popularity of wetlands statutes and a basic outline of how they work, see The 
Coastal Zone Management Program, available at www.ocrm.nos.noaa.gov. 
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the other hand, have a harder time realizing reciprocal gain from the 
restrictions on their neighbors because the benefits of ecological protection are 
more difficult to calculate.  Gauging the environmental damage caused by a 
specific parcel of land demands a more sensitive notion of causation than our 
legal culture possesses.45 
Finally, the character of the government action is different.  While neither 
involves physical appropriation, zoning strikes many as more familiar, in part 
because it has in practice been a local endeavor.46  Many Americans believe 
that the single-family home represents the natural form of domesticity, despite 
the many federal subsidies supporting it.47  Wetlands protection, on the other 
hand, is driven by a federal spending program that conditions financial grants 
on state regulation of coastal development.  The Rehnquist Court has reined in 
congressional powers exercised pursuant to Article I, section 8,48 and while it 
has not directly limited congressional authority under the spending clause,49 
the use of the takings clause here restrains the spending power indirectly.  This 
is so because the recent decisions privilege private expectations created under 
state property law in effect before the state followed the carrot of federal aid 
and established wetlands regulations. 
I ask my class whether the key difference between South Carolina’s coastal 
regulation and Euclid’s zoning ordinance is the extent of the economic 
diminution.  In other words, if Euclid’s zoning ordinance had denied Ambler 
all economic benefit, would Justice Scalia find that the ordinance effected a 
taking?  He would, unless zoning fell within the nuisance exception to Lucas’s 
 
 45. See Joseph Sax, Comment on Harte’s Paper ‘Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem 
Integrity: The Challenge of Preserving Earth’s Life Support System’, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1003, 
1004-05 (2001) (observing that “it is very difficult . . . to link the large-caliber problems of 
biodiversity loss to the specific developmental acts of individual landowners or to see the usual 
cause and effect relationships between an individual construction project and the colossal harm to 
the global future”); DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 324-25 (1990).  Cf. HORWITZ,  supra note 7, at 18-19, 51-
54, 135-36 (describing the Progressive critique of objective causation). 
 46. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part One—The Structure of Local Government 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Two—Localism and 
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (exploring the traditional deference to local 
government). 
 47. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 190-218 (1985). 
 48. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Environmental Regulations in a Post-
Lopez World: Some Questions and Answers, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10980 (2000). 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  For a recent analysis of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in 
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L. J. 1 (2001).  See also Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 
1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988). 
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bright-line rule.  To fit within this exception, a state regulation must, Justice 
Scalia wrote in Lucas, “do no more than duplicate the result that could have 
been achieved in the courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely 
affected persons) under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the State 
under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public 
generally, or otherwise.”50  In such cases, “the proscribed use interests were 
not part of [the property owner’s] title to begin with.”51 
At first glance, the Lucas exception appears circular.  The Court defined an 
exception to the state’s police power in terms of the state’s own law of 
property and nuisance.  Ordinarily, we teach first-year students that a 
legislature is free to alter the state’s background property regime—some 
historical accumulation of common and statutory law—at least prospectively.  
But Palazzolo demonstrates that some of the Justices have in mind a 
conception of “background principles” that is constitutionally bounded and that 
may transcend state lines.52  The declaration of those background principles 
remains, however, a matter of state law, so that there are limits to the Supreme 
Court’s ability to define state property rights.  But the Court is signaling to 
state courts that they should interpret state property law more strictly to protect 
traditional land rights. 
The signals are, however, mixed.  While the Palazzolo majority offered 
little guidance about how to define those “background principles,” Justice 
Scalia advocated a fixed conception and disagreed with the evolutionary 
conception of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Stephen Breyer.  Although 
Lucas and Palazzolo would not determine the outcome of a latter day Euclid, 
most students begin to see that the way Justice Scalia crafted his opinions in 
those cases might well influence the application of the ad hoc balancing test 
used in most regulatory takings cases.53  His version of the nuisance exception 
has the force of a general rule that could be applied to all takings cases, and his 
concurrence in Palazzolo further suggests that he is trying to establish a bright 
line for distinguishing constitutionally-protected property rights on the one 
 
 50. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 51. Id. at 1027. 
 52. As Frank I. Michelman observed after Lucas, the Court may be reviving the notion of a 
general federal common law associated with Swift v. Tyson and repudiated in Erie v. Tompkins.  
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and 
Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 315 (1993). 
 53. See Ferguson, supra note 23, at 1558 (predicting that the “common-law background 
principles of takings law will figure prominently in the balancing analysis undertaken in the 
majority of cases and, perhaps, will lead courts to find that a given regulation that falls short of a 
total taking is nonetheless invalid because its goals were not addressed at common law”).  See 
also Michael A. Wolff, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 20 (1996) (noting that the Lucas 
nuisance exception “holds a special bond” with other land use decisions “especially as the Court 
invokes common-law nuisance principles long eclipsed by modern statutes and regulations”). 
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hand and the legitimate objects of the police power on the other.54  Pushed to 
its logical extreme, Justice Scalia’s reasoning would greatly limit the state 
police power to nuisance control. 
III.  PALAZZOLO AND THE COMMON LAW “BACKGROUND” OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Palazzolo arose when the Rhode Island Coastal Commission denied 
Anthony Palazzolo’s application for a permit to develop his coastal property.  
Palazzolo sued the state, claiming under the Lucas rule that the Commission’s 
regulations, issued in 1971, denied him all economic benefit of land he 
acquired in 1978.55  He pleaded alternatively, under the Penn Central standard, 
that the regulations so greatly interfered with his investment-backed 
expectations that they effected a taking.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
rejected both claims on the ground that Palazzolo acquired his property after 
the enactment of the regulations and therefore took title subject to their 
development restrictions.56  The state court reasoned that, while the regulations 
might have taken property from whoever owned the parcel at the time they 
were enacted, an owner who acquired the land after their enactment could not 
pursue a takings claim; the new regulations became part of the title when the 
property was transferred. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy for a majority of the Supreme Court answered 
that 
[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean 
bundle . . . .  Just as a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, 
can limit the value of land without effecting a taking because it can be 
understood as reasonable by all concerned, other enactments are unreasonable 
and do not become less so through the passage of time or title.57 
The Court’s holding was narrow: the majority only ruled that the state could 
not automatically bar a post-enactment acquirer from challenging a land use 
 
 54. Justice Scalia has endorsed a rule-based approach to judging off the bench as well.  See 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 9. 
 55. The chain of title to the parcel at issue in Palazzolo is unusual because Palazzolo 
received title to the land when the state revoked the charter of the corporation that owned it, and 
of which he was once a part and then the sole owner, for failing to pay income taxes.  Palazzolo, 
121 S. Ct. at 2456.  As a result, this title transfer was not that of a typical purchaser buying land 
with full knowledge of the land use regulations affecting the land’s title.  Pursuant to the legal 
fiction of corporate personality and its dissolution in bankruptcy, Palazzolo was transformed from 
shareholder into freeholder.  The majority did not emphasize the peculiar circumstances of this 
transfer in its reasoning; Justice Breyer, in his dissent, did.  Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  See also Brittany Adams, Note, From Lucas to Palazzolo: A Case Study of Title 
Limitations, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 225, 261 (2001). 
 56. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456-57. 
 57. Id. at 2462. 
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regulation.  It also rejected Palazzolo’s Lucas claim,58 but it did not rule on the 
merits of the plaintiff’s Penn Central59 claim.  That determination will 
ultimately depend on the state court’s assessment of the reasonableness of 
those expectations, in light of the state’s “background principles.”  That 
decision will also help reveal the extent to which the nuisance exception to the 
Lucas rule is influencing the Penn Central standard. 
Before Palazzolo, some commentators believed that “background” had 
only a temporal connotation.  In an analysis that tracked traditional ideas of 
vested rights,60 they believed that while a legislature might not be able to alter 
some property rights retroactively, it could change all of them prospectively; a 
new regulation that redefined property rights became part of the background 
against which takings claims by post-enactment transferees would be judged.61  
But in Palazzolo, the Supreme Court held that “background” signifies 
something more than the temporal relationship between a regulation and the 
acquisition of land subject to that regulation.  The majority explained that if 
post-enactment acquirers of property could not challenge such regulations, “[a] 
State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings 
Clause.”62  It concluded that “a regulation that otherwise would be 
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background 
principle of the State’s law by mere virtue of the passage of title.”63 
The majority in Palazzolo implied that there are some property rights that 
the state may not, or at least not easily, restrict.  That is the meaning of the 
references to Locke, standing apparently for the proposition that some property 
rights are either pre-political or created at a foundational moment of consent,64 
and Hobbes, symbolizing the idea of an all powerful sovereign that may 
 
 58. Id. at 2457-58 (finding that the parties stipulated that Palazzolo “had $200,000 in 
development value remaining on an upland parcel of the property”). 
 59. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 60. On the nineteenth-century vested rights doctrine, see HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 148-51. 
 61. See, e.g., Peter L. Henderer, The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and 
the Logically Antecedent Question: A Practitioner’s Guide to the Fifth Amendment Takings of 
Wetlands, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 421-22, 426-27, 428, 436-37 (1997) (analyzing the effect of the 
Lucas exception on Clean Water Act enforcement and concluding that “the post-CWA property 
purchaser’s interest in development is not a ‘stick’ in his or her ‘bundle of rights’”); Gregory M. 
Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, Pre-enactment Owners, and 
Post-enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (2000).  See also Frank I. Michelman, Property, 
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation”, 80 HARV. 
L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
 62. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 63. Id. at 2364. 
 64. For analysis of this distinction in Locke’s thought, see Peter Laslett, Introduction to 
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 15, 113-20 (1960) (1679-83); Melvin Cherno, 
Locke on Property: A Reappraisal, 68 ETHICS 51 (1951). 
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continually redefine private rights.65  But the Court did not linger in the state of 
nature.  Quickly it returned to the less imaginary, though ill-defined, realm of 
state common law.  The majority stated that the background principles of a 
state’s law of nuisance and property remain the benchmark for judging even 
the prospective effect of new land use regulations, but it rejected the claim that 
a state statute automatically becomes part of those background principles for 
land transferred after its enactment.66 
The question remaining after Palazzolo is whether there is an expiration 
date, not on the takings clause, but rather on the reasonableness of a particular 
land use.  How and when does a land use cross the line between those uses 
permitted under a state’s background principles and those impermissible?  
Most important, what role does a legislative declaration of unreasonableness 
play in this process?  The Court’s majority declined to engage these questions, 
finding that “[w]e have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances 
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of state 
law or whether those circumstances are present here.”67 
In their concurrences and dissent, respectively, Justices Scalia, O’Connor, 
and Breyer did opine on how a new regulation affects the state’s background 
principles of property and nuisance.  While some Justices, like former Justice 
William Brennan, would classify all new legislative acts as instantly part of the 
background principles,68 Justice Scalia classifies none of them as such, unless a 
statute merely prohibits a common law nuisance.  Eschewing a hard rule, 
Justices O’Connor and Breyer are struggling to locate ground in between these 
extremes. 
For Justice Scalia, the legislative declaration of a land use as unreasonable 
is irrelevant to the judicial determination of whether a regulation effects a 
taking of that property, retroactively or prospectively.69  He assumes that the 
state’s background principles are easily identifiable and unchanging.  
Accordingly, the reasonableness of a land use does not change over time, 
though the changing circumstances around that land use might transform it into 
a nuisance.  For a land use regulation to fall within the nuisance exception, the 
activity it regulates must have been “always unlawful” and “not part of his 
title.”70 
 
 65. See JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 107-10 (1986); 
HOWARD WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES: HIS THEORY OF OBLIGATION 
325-26 (1957). 
 66. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 860 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 69. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 70. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029-30 (using the example of a nuclear power plant located on a 
newly discovered earthquake fault). 
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Despite the reference to “always,” Justice Scalia’s nuisance exception does 
not require the land use to have been treated as a common law nuisance time 
out of mind; his conception of the background principles is historically and 
analytically precise.71  The date he chooses for defining the background is 
1897,72 when the Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s taking 
clause against the States through the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment73—the first time the Supreme Court incorporated part of the Bill 
of Rights against the States and a measure of the increased solicitude for 
property rights at the time.74  There is a curious though perhaps unintentional 
realism in choosing 1897 rather than 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was enacted, or 1791, when the Fifth Amendment became part of the 
Constitution.  The benefit for his jurisprudence in looking to the late nineteenth 
century instead of the founding era is that many early state constitutions lacked 
takings clauses; states that did have takings clauses interpreted them more 
narrowly than they would a century later.75  Justice Scalia is aware of these 
narrow early interpretations but declares them “irrelevant,” in part because 
they preceded 1897 and in part because those state practices “were out of 
accord with any plausible interpretation of those provisions.”76  An advantage 
of 1897 over 1868 is that the former is approximately when modern zoning 
was born and not long before the decisions in Euclid and Pennsylvania Coal.77  
The year 1897 also coincides with the high tide of Classical Legal Thought, 
which was marked by a new or at least more explicit embrace of natural law 
conceptions of property rights and a predilection for categorical restraints on 
government power.78  Before 1868, property law was almost entirely state law; 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, or at least the Supreme Court’s 
broad interpretation of it a generation later, federalized the boundaries of state 
 
 71. See Joseph Sax, Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Property 
Rights and the Economy of Nature, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1454 (1993); Joseph Sax, Rights that 
“Inhere in the Title Itself”: The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 943, 945 (1993). 
 72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028 n. 15. 
 73. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 74. HORWITZ, supra note 7. 
 75. See generally, John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original 
Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use 
Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996); William 
M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995). 
 76. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n. 15 (1992). 
 77. Some historians identify the “White City” at the Chicago Columbian Exposition and 
World’s Fair of 1893, for example, as “the beginning of modern planning in American.”  Donald 
A. Krueckenberg, The American Planner: A New Introduction, in THE AMERICAN PLANNER, 
supra note 41, 1-14. 
 78. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 9-31, 156-59. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
726 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:713 
property law.  After the New Deal, the Supreme Court largely exited the 
business of supervising state property rights.  Consequently, the turn of the 
nineteenth century may be the best time in which to locate a transcendental 
conception of property and nuisance. 
Just as important is the negative function of the phrase “background 
principles of property and nuisance.”  A more contemporary term would be 
“regulatory environment,” and it may be to protest this modern idea as much as 
to restore the property regime of the 1890s that Justice Scalia’s version of the 
Lucas exception operates.79  He has also avoided “common law background,” 
perhaps because the prevailing, positivist conception of the common law 
makes this term oxymoronic.80  Indeed, Justice Scalia’s remedy for 
reductionist positivism—his resort to transcendental principles—is itself a 
symptom of it. 
In contrast, Justice O’Connor believes that the test for determining whether 
a regulation is consistent with a state’s background principles should resemble 
a standard.  Even when using the Lucas bright line rule she would resort to a 
standard to explore whether the regulation falls within the exception.81  In 
addition, she thinks that this “temporal relationship between regulatory 
enactment and title acquisition” should figure into a court’s calculation of 
investment-backed expectations in the Penn Central standard used in most 
regulatory takings cases.82  In contrast to Justice Scalia,83 she believes that a 
legislative declaration of unreasonableness, while not conclusive, plays a role 
in the analysis of whether a landowner had a protected property interest in the 
first place.  In other words, she does not want the strict Lucas exception to 
become identical to the investment-backed expectations factor in the Penn 
Central analysis.  “[I]t would be just as much error,” Justice O’Connor argued 
in her concurrence, “to expunge this consideration [meaning, ‘the effect of 
existing regulations’] from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it 
exclusive significance.”84  This “temporal relationship” is an important factor 
in calculating the reasonableness of a property owner’s investment-backed 
 
 79. Cf. Frank Michleman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost 
Commons: A Reply To Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 69 (1997) (observing that 
“[r]egulation stands, in our public law, as an ordinary part of the background of risk and 
opportunity against which we all take our chances in our roles as investors in property”). 
 80. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.  See also Louise A. Halper, Why the Nuisance 
Knot Can’t Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REV. 329, 330 (1995) (arguing that Justice 
Scalia’s “recourse to the common law is possible only by a determined evasion of the history of 
the common law as it applied to land use”). 
 81. “The temptation to adopt what amounts to per se rules in either direction must be 
resisted.”  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2467 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. at 2465 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2477 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 83. The two Justices openly criticized each other’s opinions. Compare id. at 2467 n.* 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) with id. at 2467-68 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. at 2465 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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expectations—a factor within a factor—because “the regulatory regime in 
place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the 
reasonableness of those expectations.”85  In his dissent, Justice Breyer agreed 
with Justice O’Connor on this point.  He added that, after the enactment of a 
regulation, “expectations will diminish in force and significance—rapidly and 
dramatically—as property continues to change hands over time.”86 
The most interesting possibility under the approach of Justices O’Connor 
and Breyer is that a regulation effecting a taking from present holders might 
someday be assimilated into the background principles of property law so that 
some or all post-enactment acquirers would not succeed with takings claims.  
There is, however, no widely accepted theory of constitutional change that 
would explain, let alone justify, this inconsistency.  Some deny that the 
Constitution should change without amendment.87  Theories accepting 
informal amendment are divided between those emphasizing “constitutional 
moments” and those that trace gradual, evolutionary change.88  They differ not 
unlike the way rules and standards differ: constitutional moments are clear and 
formal occurrences of which most people are aware; gradual change results 
from many factors, and not everyone agrees on how and when it happens.  
Evolutionary legal change is more difficult to explain.  It involves some 
mixture of time, the assimilation of the regulation’s means into our legal 
culture, and the regulation’s popular acceptance.  In turn, acceptance depends 
on a negotiation between the consumers and enforcers of law; here, between 
 
 85. Id. at 2466.  See also Adams, supra note 56 at 261 (stating that “the most equitable 
approach to these fact-sensitive cases is to closely examine the issues surrounding each case” 
such as the time the regulation was “in place” before acquisition); Carol Rose, Preservation and 
Community: New Directions in the Law of Historical Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981) 
(discussing the community-building function of laws that preserve historical buildings). 
 86. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477. 
 87. Compare Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 239 (1989) (concluding that “[t]he framers and ratifiers did not want the 
Constitution to change in adaptation to the economic, political, cultural, or moral developments of 
American society”), with Kramer, supra note 49 at 16-33 (exploring the customary “popular 
constitutionalism” of the founding generation). 
 88. Compare BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, 2 vols. (1991, 1998), with David A. 
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) (“The 
constitutional principles that actually govern a mature society accumulate and evolve over time 
through a variety of complex means”).  See also Strauss supra note 6; BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: 
Emergence of a New Reason, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 2014-15 (1990); Eben Moglen, The 
Incompleat Burkean: Bruce Ackerman’s Foundation for Constitutional History, 5 YALE J. L. & 
HUM. 531, 547-53 (1993) (finding a revival of Burkean custom in recent constitutional theory).  
See generally MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AND AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL (2000); HERMAN BELZ, A 
LIVING CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW? AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 245-48 (1998). 
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property owners, who calculate whether it is wiser to sue for inverse 
condemnation or compromise with local land use officials,89 and the Supreme 
Court Justices, whose willingness to entertain such suits changes over time and 
with the type of regulation.  The open question is whether, and if so to what 
extent, the state legislature participates in this process of negotiating the 
constitutional meaning of property rights.90 
This is why Palazzolo is a wonderful teaching tool.  It is a constitutional 
case but also raises questions about the nature of the common law.  Most of the 
Court acknowledges that property rights change over time, but the case 
provides no way of understanding when a particular right has changed.  The 
best term for this process is custom. 
The problem is that our post-realist legal culture lacks not just a 
convincing theory of evolutionary constitutionalism; it also lacks a 
sophisticated way of discussing the irregular changes in any body of law that 
Anglo-American legal thinkers used to capture under the rubric of custom.91  
The positivist turn in legal theory has collapsed foreground and background, 
legislation and common law, the traditions of the interpretive community of 
common lawyers and who gets what, when, how.92  Legal realism has come to 
stand for the proposition that law is politics.  But the slogan has been torn from 
its political context as a criticism of Classical Legal Thought and its natural 
law conception of property.93  The instrumental conception of the common law 
has rendered the idea of custom irrelevant to most modern theories of law.  
There remains little sense of how lawyers and judges, for better and ill, have 
reshaped that tradition to accommodate and also influence “the felt necessities 
of the time”94  We do have theories of norms, and norms may seem like 
substitutes for custom.  The older idea of custom, however, included room for 
change that did not follow academic logic; today’s norms, we are told, hew to 
 
 89. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 749 (1986) (discussing the role of “self-management by 
orderly and civilized people” in the evolution of property rights). 
 90. A growing literature is exploring the legislature’s role in defining constitutions.  See 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 91. See A.W. B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND 
LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359 (1987) (noting the decline of custom in 
Anglo-American law); Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality 
without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 45-47 (1993) (noting the rise and decline of 
evolutionary custom in English law).  As Horwitz notes, the immemorial conception of custom 
gave way to an evolutionary one in the seventeenth century.  Id.  See also Rose supra note 91 
(discussing custom in property law). 
 92. See HAROLD D. LASWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936).  For an 
observation similar to mine but containing a different prescription, see ALAN BRUDNER, THE 
UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995). 
 93. This interpretation of legal realism relies on HORWITZ supra note 19. 
 94. See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE TOOLS OF LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 729 
the laws of efficiency.95  The closest we come to exploring custom in this 
traditional sense of a gradually changing corpus is in first-year courses like 
Property that analyze recalcitrant common law rules, how they change over 
time and the forces that guide that change.96  Outside those courses, custom 
makes few appearances. 
The Supreme Court may bring it back to the mainstream.  It is trying to 
distinguish legislation and principle, foreground and background, anew.  
Justice Scalia does so by embracing hard rules and static background 
principles.  Justices O’Connor and Breyer, on the other hand, are groping 
toward a customary conception of property rights.  Historically in Anglo-
American legal culture, custom was a concept that functioned to allow legal 
professionals to negotiate incremental change while maintaining, as a matter of 
ideology, that the common law remained substantially the same from 
generation to generation.  It was method more than substance.97  As Sir 
Matthew Hale wrote in the late seventeenth century, law responds to “the 
Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniences of the People,” so that over time 
“there grows insensibly a Variation of Laws.”  When and how those exigencies 
altered the common law was, Hale thought, difficult to trace; statutes played a 
role along with “Judicial Resolutions.”  Nonetheless, 
tho’ those particular Variations and Accessions have happened in the Laws, yet 
they being only partial and successive, we may with just Reason say, They are 
the same English Laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the general.  As 
the Argonauts Ship was the same when it returned home, as it was when it 
went out, tho’ in that long Voyage it had successive Amendments, and scarce 
came back with any of its former Materials.98 
This is a vision of legal change more radical than the “changed circumstances” 
conception Justice Scalia endorses.99  A brief survey of American land use 
regulation suggests that it remains relevant to the question of whether wetlands 
regulations reflect a fair evolution of customary property rights.100 
IV.  THE LEGISLATIVE TRADITION OF MORAL TOPOGRAPHY 
Do environmental land use regulations offend the background principles of 
American property law?  John F. Hart’s examination of early American land 
 
 95. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991).  See also Richard Epstein, The Path to the T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of 
Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 3 (1992). 
 96. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989); 
See also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 154-61 (1988). 
 97. See Simpson supra note 93 at 376. 
 98. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 40 (Charles Gray 
ed., 1971). 
 99. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1992). 
 100. For a different approach to a similar question see Rose, supra note 91. 
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use regulation101 demonstrates that there is a long tradition of land use 
legislation based on what might be called moral topography: the belief that 
forms of land use have moral consequences.102  For example, after the 
American Revolution the new states regulated the physical use of space to 
create a civic republican environment.103  The private was public in the sense 
that early Americans believed that the visual experience of a neighborhood 
inculcated values that in turn shaped human behavior.  The built environment 
was didactic; it was designed, literally, to educate citizens.104 
The specific conception of the best way to shape the land has changed over 
time and at most times is contested.  In broad outline, the neoclassicism that 
was the aesthetic expression of republican ideology—the grid, clean lines, 
spare facades, monumental public buildings and a wariness toward untamed 
nature105—gave way in the nineteenth century to a romantic conception 
emphasizing organic shapes, fanciful design and a pastoral vision of nature.106  
Its legal manifestation took the form of, for example, public parks and 
cemetery laws.107 
Progressives at the end of the nineteenth century returned focus to the 
urban environment.  More light and air circulation would, they thought, reduce 
disease; healthy citizens would avoid vice and become productive members of 
society.108  Recent ecological regulation is also premised on a belief that how 
Americans use their physical environment reflects and shapes who they are as 
a people.  While these land use regulations often retard economic development, 
 
 101. See Hart, supra note 76, at 1007. 
 102. Cf. Chused, supra note 42 at 601 (quoting PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL 
ORDER, 1820-1920 (1978) (arguing that the “‘positive environmentalism’” of the Progressive era 
represented a break from earlier planning theories).  See also Martha A. Lees, Preserving 
Property Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate over 
Zoning for Exclusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 370 
(arguing that proponents of zoning sought to “actualize” the ideologies of domesticity and 
pastoralism). 
 103. See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1860 (1983). 
 104. See J. B. Jackson, The Order of a Landscape: Reason and Religion in Newtonian 
America, INTERPRETATION OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES: GEOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS, 153-63 (D. W. 
Meinig, ed., 1979); JOHN R. STILGOE, COMMON LANDSCAPE OF AMERICA, 1580-1845 87-134 
(1982).  On the didactic strand of the American Enlightenment, see generally HENRY MAY, THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976). 
 105. See JOHN D. SEELYE, BEAUTIFUL MACHINE: RIVERS AND THE REPUBLICAN PLAN, 
1755-1825 (1991). 
 106. See THOMAS BENDER, TOWARD AN URBAN VISION: IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1975). 
 107. See, e.g., THE PARK AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF CENTRAL PARK (Elizabeth 
Blackmar and Roy Rosenzweig eds., 1992). 
 108. See LUBOVE supra note 41; Chused, supra note 42. 
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they are also leavened with human-centered utilitarianism, with calls for 
sustainable or “smart growth.”109 
The point for instructional purposes is that there has been a long tradition 
of legislative shaping of our physical environment that includes but is not 
limited to zoning.  The tradition has persisted, although its constitutive 
materials have changed radically.  Courts have shown great deference to this 
tradition except when it has been used explicitly to exclude people on the basis 
of race or ethnicity.110  Early Americans did not recognize these regulations as 
taking property because not all expectation interests were recognized as legal 
interests until the Supreme Court, in a series of late nineteenth-century rate 
regulation cases, constitutionalized the protection of what we now call 
investment-backed expectations.111  Put simply, the bag of early modern writs 
did not include one for suing government officials for reducing the 
development potential of land caused by the legislative pursuit of moral 
topography.  We tend to think of the “bundle of sticks” metaphor as reflecting 
a modern conception of property, but in the early modern period property 
really was a bundle of interests rather than a coherent thing.  It was a bundle of 
rights because Anglo-American legal culture had developed a bundle of 
common law writs to vindicate those rights; institutionally at least, writ 
preceded right.112  The state’s denial of one of those recognized interests, 
whether directly through physical appropriation or indirectly through 
regulation, amounted to a taking.  If there was no recognized interest, there 
was no taking. 
Today, investment-backed expectations are factored into the scrutiny of 
regulations that may go “too far.”  A conventional, or customary, conception of 
expectation interests would preserve room for change and ensure that such 
interests do not rigidify into unchangeable, static rights.113  That process—the 
 
 109. See, e.g., James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on 
Government Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life under the Takings and 
Other Provisions, 9 DICKINSON J. ENVT’L. L. & POL. 421 (2001). 
 110. See Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of 
Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59 (1994). 
 111. See HORWITZ supra note 7 at 148-51, 160-64, 194-98.  See also Stephen A. Siegel, 
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abstraction of rights—has helped destroy theories of custom.114  If Justice 
Scalia’s version of investment-backed expectations succeeds, a dynamic sense 
of expectations interests will fade too. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A century and more of positivist legal theory has, as it were, accustomed 
us to viewing legal principles as social constructions; while they do change 
over time, it remains difficult and controversial to take a free hand in the 
building.  Perhaps this is what the Supreme Court is trying to say in its 
regulatory takings jurisprudence.  Understood functionally, when the Court 
holds that a regulation effects a taking, it is signaling that the legislature has 
tried to accelerate change faster than the Justices believe fair or wise.115  
“Taking” symbolizes the belief that the means of the law are endangering its 
ends, that the tools of the law threaten the rule of law.  This judgment too is “a 
question of degree”116—a matter of convention—and no doctrine will ever 
make it mechanical.117  Students sense the difficulty when asked to apply 
modern takings doctrine to old zoning cases.  Someday, before the bar and on 
the bench, they will participate in that judgment.  It is not yet clear whether 
they will continue to do so as voters and legislators. 
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